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Abstract 
Regulations are shown to have a significant impact on entrepreneurial activity, especially on startups by 
smaller firms. Higher compliance costs are shown to deter small firms entering a new industry. In this study, 
using state-level regulation data in the U.S., we examine whether different types of regulations (including 
“health and safety regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, 
“environmental regulations”, and “zoning regulations”) in each state deter smaller firms to do business in that 
state. We also examine whether each type of regulation deters firms to do business in certain industries or to 
operate in more or fewer states. Besides size, operational area, and industry, we also examine whether each 
type of regulation deters younger firms to do business in each state. Our results show that “health and safety 
regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, and “environmental regulations” 
in a state affect firm size and industry, but do not affect operational area and firm age. In the states with high 
scores in these areas, there are fewer single-employee firms but more 2-20 employee firms when compared to 
the other states. Also, in the states with a high score in “environmental regulations”, we find fewer firms with 
51 to 100 employees when compared to the other states. On the other hand, “zoning regulations” affect firm 
age and industry, but not operational area and firm size. In the states with high scores in “zoning regulations”, 
we find fewer firms that are established less than a year ago. Finally, in the states with high scores in 
regulations, generally, we find that more firms are in the “Business” industry and fewer firms are in the 
“Writing” industry. Overall, we show how each type of regulation deter certain types of firms operating in 
each state. This is important because if a state wants to attract certain types of firms (i.e., younger, or older 
firms, larger or smaller firms, or firms in certain industries), the officials in that state need to improve the 
corresponding regulations first. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two competing theories on the relationship between regulations and entrepreneurship. The public 
interest model states that regulations are good for society because they help prevent market failures. On the 
other hand, the public choice model states that regulations deter new entrants in an industry (i.e., reduces 
competition) and that this is bad for society. According to this model, regulations are supported by the existing 
firms because they increase the costs of entry and compliance, which in turn discourages new entrants. Most 
of the previous papers, including Stigler (2021), Peltzman (1976), Djankov et al. (2002), Klapper et al. (2006), 
Nyström (2008), and others, support the public choice model. Regulations have a bigger impact on smaller 
firms because larger firms can cover higher compliance costs while smaller firms fail to cope with these costs. 
This size effect is shown in Klapper et al. (2006), Van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007), Helland and Matsuno 
(2003), and Branstetter et al. (2014), Calcagno and Sobel (2013), and Bailey and Thomas (2017). Calcagno 
and Sobel (2013) show that regulations force firms to become larger (to cope with the costs). In this study, we 
look at the size-effect using state-level regulation data in the USA. Our first contribution is to go into more 
detail and examine whether different types of regulations “health and safety regulations”, “employment 
regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, “environmental regulations”, or “zoning regulations” help 
attract (or deter) smaller firms from operating in each state. For example, do smaller firms refrain from doing 
    Business Ethics and Leadership, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2021 
                                                                                                                                       ISSN (online) – 2520-6311; ISSN (print) – 2520-6761 
67 
business in a state if that state’s employment regulations are unfavorable? Or do they care more about the 
health and safety regulations, tax code, or licensing regulations? Or maybe small businesses are more worried 
about environmental regulations or zoning regulations? So, our first contribution is to examine in detail 
whether different types of regulations in a state affect a small firm’s decision to do business in that state.  
Besides looking at the size-effect, we also look at firm age, firm industry, and operational area. Does each type 
of regulation help attract (or deter) younger firms from operating in each state? Do younger firms care more 
about employment regulations, licensing regulations, or another type of regulation? If a state has unfavorable 
employment regulations, does this deter younger firms from operating in that state? How about the industry-
effect? Do firms in certain industries care more about employment regulations, tax code, or another type of 
regulation? Also, does each type of regulation attract larger firms with a larger operational area? Therefore, 
our second contribution is to examine whether different types of regulations in a state attract (or deter) younger 
firms, firms in certain industries, or firms with a larger operational area into that state. Overall, this paper 
shows how each type of regulation attracts (or deter) certain types of firms operating in each state. It is 
important because if a state wants to attract certain types of firms (i.e., younger, or older firms, larger or smaller 
firms, or firms in certain industries), the officials in that state need to improve the corresponding regulations 
first. We review the previous literature in Section 2. The data and the methodology are explained in Section 3. 
The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 includes our concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review  
There are two competing theories on the relationship between regulations and entrepreneurship. The first 
model is the public interest model (Pigou 1938), which states that regulations help maximize public welfare 
by preventing market failures. The second model, which is called the public choice model, following Tullock 
(1967) and supported by many papers, including Stigler (2021), Peltzman (1976) states that existing industry 
participants promote regulations to protect themselves from new entrants. This model assumes that politicians 
implement these to benefit the existing firms, which would support them in future elections. Several papers 
empirically examine the relationship between regulations and entrepreneurship. Almost all these papers 
support the public choice model. The consensus is that regulations tend to have a negative impact on 
entrepreneurial activity and that smaller firms are affected more. By reducing new competition, regulations 
may also lead existing producers to become less innovative (Birnbaum, 1984; Thomas, 1990). Djankov et al. 
(2002) examine 85 countries and show that the countries with stricter entry regulations are more likely to have 
more corruption.  
According to the authors, in these countries, existing producers use politicians to enact stricter entry regulations 
to protect themselves from new competition. In these countries, there is also a bigger informal economy. When 
the number of procedures to start a business is relatively high in a country, new entrants are relatively low. 
Klapper et al. (2006) support this view by showing a negative relationship between entry requirements and the 
number of new entrants. They also show that if barriers to entry are higher, new entrants tend to be larger (i.e., 
only larger firms can cover the high costs of entry). The authors also state that higher barriers to entry hurt 
society by eliminating the competition. Acs et al. (2009) show that more regulation affects entrepreneurial 
activity negatively. Nyström (2008) supports this by showing that labor, business, and credit regulations affect 
entrepreneurial activity negatively. Kreft and Sobel (2005) show regulations, taxes, and private property rights 
as essential determinants of entrepreneurial activity. Van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007) find that while 
administrative considerations are not important for nascent or young businesses, labor market regulations and 
minimum capital requirements are important. Parker (2007) shows that rules and regulations affect the 
organizational form of startups. Dreher and Gassebner (2013) show that entrepreneurial activity is negatively 
affected if the startup process is more complex or larger minimum capital requirements. Sobel et al. (2007) 
show that both domestic and international restrictions hurt entrepreneurial activity. 
Several other papers show a negative relationship between environmental regulations and entrepreneurial 
activity (see Pashigian, 1984; Brock and Evans, 1989; Dean and Brown, 1995). Helland and Matsuno (2003) 
find that the compliance costs deter new entrants and help larger firms cover these costs. Branstetter et al. 
(2014) show that regulatory reforms helped entrepreneurial activity in Portugal, especially among the smaller, 
weaker firms. Regulations have a bigger impact on smaller firms because larger firms can cover higher 
compliance costs while smaller firms fail to cope with these costs. This size-effect is shown in many studies 
besides Klapper et al. (2006), Van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007), Helland and Matsuno (2003), and 
Branstetter et al. (2014). For example, Calcagno and Sobel (2013) show that regulations force firms to become 
larger (to cope with the costs). Bailey and Thomas (2017) differentiate between different industries and show 
that highly regulated industries have less entrepreneurial activity and slower employment growth. They also 
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show that regulations affect small firms more negatively. Several papers look from a broader perspective and 
examine how the institutions overall affect entrepreneurial activity. Valdez and Richardson (2013) suggest that 
a society's normative, cultural–cognitive, and regulative institutions affect entrepreneurial activity. According 
to Wennekers and Thurik (1999), institutional framework and demographic, technological, and economic 
forces are essential for the entrepreneurial environment. Culture is important for entrepreneurial activity. 
Nyström (2008) argues that legal structure, size of the government, property rights, and credit, labor, and 
business regulations significantly affect entrepreneurial activity. Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) explain that both 
the existence of opportunities and the quality of formal institutions affect entrepreneurship. Ovaska and Sobel 
(2005) explain that corruption levels, credit availability, foreign direct investment, contract enforcement, sound 
monetary policy, and policies supporting economic freedom are important for entrepreneurial activity. 
Bjornskov and Foss (2008) show that the size of government is negatively correlated with entrepreneurial 
activity. Some of the previous studies focus on specific countries. For example, Welter (2004) explains that 
business chambers, business support agencies, and associations should be more accommodative to women 
entrepreneurs in Germany, business chambers, and associations. Bock (2004) explains that rural development 
policies mostly support male entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. Bitzenis and Nito (2005) show that, in Albania, 
several factors, including unfair competition, changes in taxation procedures, lack of financial resources, and 
problems related to public order, are detrimental to entrepreneurship, while others like bureaucracy and 
corruption are not.  
Bergmann and Sternberg (2007) examine the entrepreneurial activity in Germany and show that the change in 
the unemployment level in a region affects startup propensity. Aidis et al. (2007) explain that, for Lithuania 
and Ukraine, besides the formal institutions, the informal institutions like gendered norms and values also 
restrict women’s startup activities and their access to resources. Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008) explain 
that Russia's business environment favors entrepreneurial insiders rather than entrepreneurial outsiders (i.e., 
newcomers) regarding new business start-ups. Manolova, Eunni, and Gyoshev (2008) show that the 
entrepreneurs in Hungary and Latvia were worried about the availability of skills/knowledge needed for 
entrepreneurship. They show that, in addition to the availability of skills/knowledge, in Bulgaria, the 
entrepreneurs were unhappy with the laws, government policies, and regulations promoting entrepreneurship, 
while in Hungary, entrepreneurs were skeptical about societal attitudes toward entrepreneurship. Nawaser et 
al. (2011) explain that laws, regulations and motivational factors are detrimental to entrepreneurship in Iran. 
Ghani, Kerr, and O'Connell (2014) find that, in India, entrepreneurial activity depends upon the education level 
of local people, the quality of the physical infrastructure, and the strictness of labor regulations. García-Posada 
and Mora-Sanguinetti (2015) find that, in Spain, higher judicial efficacy increases the entry rate of firms, while 
it does not affect the exit rate. Overall, previous literature generally supports the public choice model, which 
states that regulations protect existing firms and larger firms while deterring new firm creation or new entrants 
in an industry. In other words, these studies generally argue that regulations hurt entrepreneurial activity. 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this study, our objective is to see how regulations in a state affects firm characteristics. We examine how 
different types of regulations including health and safety regulations, employment regulations, tax code, 
licensing regulations, environmental regulations, and zoning regulations affect the type of firms (i.e., 
operational area, firm age, firm size, and industry) operating in each state. The variables in this study are:  
➢ Healthreg: score on health and safety regulations;  
➢ Employreg: score on employment, labor and hiring regulations as computed by the survey; 
➢ Taxcode: score on tax code and tax-related regulations as computed by the survey; 
➢ Licenreg: score on licensing forms, requirements and fees regulations as computed by the survey; 
➢ Environreg: score on environmental regulations as computed by the survey; 
➢ Zoningreg: score on zoning regulations as computed by the survey. 
The scores on healthreg (i.e., “health and safety regulations”), employreg (i.e. “employment, labor and hiring 
regulations”, taxcode (i.e., “tax code and tax-related regulations”), licenreg (i.e. “licensing forms, requirements 
and fees regulations”), environreg (i.e. “environmental regulations”), and zoningreg (i.e. “zoning regulations”) 
are in the survey dataset. We converted the letter grades of the survey to numbers (A+ is now 12 and F is now 1). 
The firm characteristic variables which we will examine are: 
1. Operational area variables: 
➢ Operstates1: operating in 1 state; 
➢ Operstates2-5: operating in 2-5 states; 
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➢ Operstate>5: operating in >5 states; 
➢ Mostlocal: most sales are local (i.e., within 50 miles of the firm). 
2. Firm size variables: 
➢ Employees1: firm has only 1 employee; 
➢ Employees2-20: firm has 2-20 employees; 
➢ Employees21-50: firm has 21-50 employees; 
➢ Employees51-100: firm has 51-100 employees; 
➢ Employees>100: firm has >100 employees. 
3. Firm age variables: 
➢ Ageofbus<1: firm is established <1 year ago; 
➢ Ageofbus1-2: firm is established 1-2 years ago; 
➢ Ageofbus3-4: firm is established 3-4 years ago; 
➢ Ageofbus>4: firm is established >4 years ago. 
The industry variables “Business”, “Writing”, etc. are self-explanatory. We first compute the percentage value 
for each state. For example, in California, if thirty percent of firms operate in only California, then California’s 
“Operstates1” score is 30 (percent). If fifteen percent of firms in California operate in two-five states, then 
California’s “Operstates2-5” score is 15 (percent), etc. When doing the empirical analyses, we will run 
nonparametric tests that compare “high” and “low” healthreg score states in terms of firm characteristic. To 
divide between high- and low-overall score states, we use the mean value of healthreg. Then, we do the same 
for “employreg” score. We will run nonparametric tests that compare “high” and “low” employereg score 
states in terms of firm characteristic variables. We use the mean value of employreg to separate high- and low- 
score states. We follow the same process for the other regulation variables (i.e., “taxcode”, “licenreg”, 
environreg” and “zoningreg”). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our variables. 
Table 1. Sample Statistics (%) 
Variable Mean Median Stdev Min Max 
Panel A. Regulations 
Healthreg 6.95 7.00 3.49 1.00 12.00 
Employreg 7.02 7.00 3.52 1.00 12.00 
Taxcode 6.95 7.00 3.51 1.00 12.00 
Licenreg 7.02 7.00 3.55 1.00 12.00 
Environreg 6.93 7.00 3.53 1.00 12.00 
Zoningreg 7.00 7.00 3.46 1.00 12.00 
Panel B. Operational Area 
Operstates1 64.77 67.07 12.83 33.33 85.39 
Operstates2-5 27.64 26.53 13.28 8.24 66.67 
Operstates>5 7.59 7.53 2.56 0.00 15.00 
Mostlocal 87.66 88.24 6.02 65.00 100.00 
Panel C. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 6.16 6.02 2.84 0.00 11.90 
Ageofbus1-2 17.31 16.67 5.58 5.26 35.00 
Ageofbus3-4 18.06 18.63 4.26 8.70 29.03 
Ageofbus>4 58.46 57.50 7.74 45.74 84.21 
Panel D. Firm Size 
Employees1 53.03 52.17 6.98 36.11 68.18 
Employees2-20 45.49 45.23 6.70 31.82 63.16 
Employees21-50 0.87 0.77 0.90 0.00 2.94 
Employees51-100 0.21 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.61 
Employees>100 0.40 0.00 0.90 0.00 5.00 
Panel E. Firm Industry 
Business 5.59 5.32 3.00 0.00 15.00 
Care 4.48 3.88 3.05 0.00 17.39 
Events 21.96 20.97 6.31 10.00 44.12 
Instruction 7.04 7.26 3.32 0.00 15.00 
Vehicle 2.47 2.60 1.67 0.00 5.65 
Health 12.94 12.30 5.35 4.35 28.57 
Home 35.03 35.42 5.54 21.74 45.00 
Technology 9.73 9.52 4.97 0.00 30.00 
Writing 0.77 0.47 0.91 0.00 3.66 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 compares the firm characteristics across the high- and low-“health regulations score” states. The Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test results are in the last column. 
Table 2. The Impact of "Health Regulations" on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 64.69 68.48 64.89 67.05 0.4895 
Operstates2-5 27.17 25.00 28.23 27.11 0.3468 
Operstates>5 8.15 8.24 6.88 7.36 0.1528 
Mostlocal 87.27 88.49 88.16 87.46 0.3371 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 6.16 6.08 6.16 5.97 0.3565 
Ageofbus1-2 17.28 17.50 17.36 15.61 0.2951 
Ageofbus3-4 18.27 18.46 17.81 18.93 0.4582 
Ageofbus>4 58.30 57.14 58.67 58.41 0.2390 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 51.20 51.61 55.37 54.27 **0.0319 
Employees2-20 47.29 45.67 43.19 44.15 **0.0302 
Employees21-50 0.89 0.77 0.85 0.70 0.4301 
Employees51-100 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.1384 
Employees>100 0.44 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.3270 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.11 5.71 4.92 4.91 *0.0670 
Care 4.08 3.83 4.99 4.35 0.4116 
Events 21.79 20.97 22.18 21.44 0.3713 
Instruction 6.85 6.15 7.27 7.71 0.2642 
Vehicle 2.64 2.82 2.25 2.43 0.2186 
Health 12.49 11.64 13.52 13.06 0.1930 
Home 35.48 35.42 34.46 35.33 0.3371 
Technology 9.94 9.52 9.47 9.20 0.4738 
Writing 0.63 0.00 0.94 0.81 0.1135 
Source: Compiled by the author 
First, we compare the high- and low-score states in terms of the operational area variables. We also look at the 
percentage of firms with ninety percent or more of their sales within fifty miles (i.e., “most local”). We see 
that the two groups of states are not significantly different from each other regarding the operational area 
variables. While 64.69% of the firms in the high-score states operate in a single state, the corresponding 
percentage is 64.89% in the low-score states. This difference is insignificant (p=0.4895). While 27.17% of the 
firms in the high-score states operate in two to five states, the corresponding percentage is 28.23% in the low-
score states. This difference is also statistically insignificant (p=0.3468). Finally, while 8.15% of the firms in 
the high-score states operate in more than five states, the corresponding percentage is 6.88% in the low-score 
states. This difference is also statistically insignificant (p=0.1528). The result for “most local” is also 
insignificant. While 87.27% of the firms in the high-score states have most of their sales within fifty miles, the 
corresponding percentage is 88.16% in the low-score states. This difference is also statistically insignificant 
(p=0.3371). The result for “firm age” is also insignificant. The mean percentage of firms that are less than one 
year old, one-to-two years old, three-to-four years old, and more than four years old are 6.16%, 17.28%, 
18.27%, and 58.30%, respectively, for the high-score states.  
The corresponding percentages are 6.16%, 17.36%, 17.81%, and 58.67% for the low-score states. None of the 
differences between the two groups in terms of the age groups is statistically significant. With regard to firm 
size, we can see that there are fewer firms with a single employee in the high-score states (i.e., 51.20%) 
compared to the low-score states (i.e., 55.37%). This difference is significant (p=0.0319). Interestingly, we see 
more firms with 2-20 employees in the high-score states (i.e., 47.29%) than the low-score states (i.e., 43.19%). 
The p-value of the difference is 0.0302. Therefore, we can conclude that the high-score states, on average, 
have fewer single-employee firms and more 2-20 employee firms when compared to the low-score states. We 
do not see any difference between the two groups in terms of the other firm size groups. The two groups are 
similar concerning the percentage of larger firms. With regard to firm industry, we can see that there is no 
significant difference between the two groups except for the “Business” industry. There are significantly more 
firms in the high-score states in the “Business” industry compared to the low-score states. While 6.11% of the 
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firms in the high-score states are in this industry, the corresponding percentage is 4.92% in the low-score states. 
This difference is statistically significant (p=0.0670). Table 3 compares the firm characteristics across the high- 
and low- “employment regulations score” states. We see that none of the operational area variables or the local 
sales variable (i.e., “most local”) is significantly different between the two groups. In other words, the “high 
score states” and the “low score states” have similar values. When we look at firm age, we do not see any 
significant difference between the two groups. None of the firm age variables is significantly different across 
high- and low-score states. With regard to firm size, we are seeing that there are fewer firms with a single 
employee in the high-score states (i.e., 49.78%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 56.12%). This difference 
is significant (p=0.0010). Also, we are seeing that there are more firms with 2-20 employees in the high-score 
states (i.e., 48.45%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 42.67%). This difference is also statistically 
significant (p=0.0038). We do not see any difference between the two groups in terms of the other firm size 
groups. The two groups are similar concerning the percentage of larger firms. 
Table 3. The Impact of "Employment Regulations" on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 64.29 67.92 65.24 66.67 0.4378 
Operstates2-5 27.61 25.77 27.66 26.71 0.4792 
Operstates>5 8.11 8.45 7.10 7.26 0.2169 
Mostlocal 86.85 87.48 88.44 88.49 0.4021 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 5.86 5.56 6.45 6.08 0.2830 
Ageofbus1-2 17.29 17.29 17.34 15.97 0.3722 
Ageofbus3-4 17.68 18.18 18.43 18.86 0.1841 
Ageofbus>4 59.17 57.24 57.78 57.50 0.4948 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 49.78 50.68 56.12 55.00 ***0.0010 
Employees2-20 48.45 47.46 42.67 44.17 ***0.0038 
Employees21-50 1.03 0.82 0.72 0.57 0.2138 
Employees51-100 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.3730 
Employees>100 0.51 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.2476 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.40 6.18 4.81 5.17 *0.0720 
Care 3.88 3.80 5.05 4.42 0.1483 
Events 22.38 20.80 21.55 21.00 0.4844 
Instruction 6.71 6.14 7.34 8.06 0.1806 
Vehicle 2.32 2.34 2.61 2.60 0.2870 
Health 11.64 11.02 14.18 13.08 **0.0124 
Home 35.85 36.50 34.24 35.00 0.1367 
Technology 10.40 9.52 9.10 8.87 0.3240 
Writing 0.42 0.00 1.10 0.98 ***0.0032 
Source: Compiled by the author 
With regard to firm industry, we are seeing that there is no significant difference between the two groups 
except for the “Business”, “Health”, and “Writing” industries. There are significantly more firms in the high-
score states that are in the “Business” industry when compared to the low-score states. While 6.40% of the 
firms in the high-score states are in this industry, the corresponding percentage is 4.81% in the low-score states. 
This difference is statistically significant (p=0.0720). On the other hand, there are significantly fewer firms in 
the high-score states that are in the “Health” and “Writing” industries when compared to the low-score states. 
While 11.64% of the firms in the high-score states are in this industry, the corresponding percentage is 14.18% 
in the low-score states.  
This difference is statistically significant (p=0.0124). While 0.42% of the firms in the high-score states are in 
this industry, the corresponding percentage is 1.10% in the low-score states. The p-value of the difference is 
0.0032. Table 4 examines the firm characteristics across the high- and low- “tax code score” states. We are 
seeing that none of the operational area variables or the local sales variable (i.e., “most local”) is significantly 
different between the two groups. In other words, the “high score states” and the “low score states” have similar 
values. When we look at firm age, again we are not seeing any significant difference between the two groups. 
None of the firm age variables is significantly different across high- and low-score states. 
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Table 4. The Impact of "Tax Code" on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 65.72 68.49 63.43 66.31 0.2214 
Operstates2-5 26.26 23.92 29.58 27.50 0.1704 
Operstates>5 8.02 7.82 6.99 7.53 0.2374 
Mostlocal 87.23 87.87 88.28 88.49 0.4631 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 6.28 5.89 5.99 6.02 0.3457 
Ageofbus1-2 17.37 17.29 17.24 15.71 0.2499 
Ageofbus3-4 18.20 18.32 17.87 18.86 0.4059 
Ageofbus>4 58.15 55.79 58.90 58.14 0.1573 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 50.73 51.12 56.26 55.00 ***0.0021 
Employees2-20 47.74 46.73 42.31 43.75 ***0.0028 
Employees21-50 0.85 0.70 0.91 0.83 0.3977 
Employees51-100 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.3082 
Employees>100 0.46 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.2889 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.32 6.03 4.56 4.93 **0.0391 
Care 4.13 3.86 4.97 4.28 0.4213 
Events 21.49 20.80 22.61 22.46 0.4526 
Instruction 6.83 6.25 7.33 7.96 0.2541 
Vehicle 2.73 2.84 2.10 2.35 0.1298 
Health 12.24 11.44 13.93 13.08 *0.0657 
Home 36.14 36.26 33.46 34.78 *0.0592 
Technology 9.69 9.07 9.80 9.52 0.2670 
Writing 0.44 0.00 1.23 1.06 ***0.0027 
Source: Compiled by the author 
With regard to firm size, we are seeing that there are fewer firms with a single employee in the high-score 
states (i.e., 50.73%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 56.26%). This difference is significant (p=0.0021). 
Also, we are seeing that there are more firms with 2-20 employees in the high-score states (i.e., 47.74%) 
compared to the low-score states (i.e., 42.31%). This difference is also statistically significant (p=0.0028). We 
do not see any difference between the two groups in terms of the other firm size groups. The two groups are 
similar with respect to the percentage of larger firms. With regard to firm industry, we are seeing that there is 
no significant difference between the two groups except for the “Business”, “Health”, “Home”, and “Writing” 
industries. There are significantly more firms in the high-score states that are in the “Business” and “Home” 
industries when compared to the low-score states. On the other hand, there are significantly fewer firms in the 
high-score states that are in the “Health” and “Writing” industries when compared to the low-score states.  
Table 5 compares the firm characteristics across the high- and low- “licensing regulations score” states. We 
are seeing that none of the operational area variables or the local sales variable (i.e., “most local”) is 
significantly different between the two groups. In other words, the “high score states” and the “low score 
states” have similar values. When we look at firm age, again we are not seeing any significant difference 
between the two groups. None of the firm age variables is significantly different across high- and low-score 
states. With regard to firm size, we are seeing that there are fewer firms with a single employee in the high-
score states (i.e., 50.95%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 55.01%). This difference is significant 
(p=0.0184). Also, we are seeing that there are more firms with 2-20 employees in the high-score states (i.e., 
47.30%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 43.76%). This difference is also statistically significant 
(p=0.0543). We do not see any difference between the two groups in terms of the other firm size groups. The 
two groups are similar with respect to the percentage of larger firms. 
With regard to firm industry, we are seeing that there is no significant difference between the two groups 
except for the “Business”, “Vehicle”, and “Writing” industries. There are significantly more firms in the high-
score states that are in the “Business” industry when compared to the low-score states. On the other hand, there 
are significantly fewer firms in the high-score states that are in the “Vehicle” and “Writing” industries when 
compared to the low-score states.  
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Table 5. The Impact of “Licensing Regulations” on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 65.69 68.49 63.91 66.31 0.2830 
Operstates2-5 26.40 23.92 28.81 27.50 0.2406 
Operstates>5 7.91 7.82 7.28 7.53 0.3382 
Mostlocal 87.17 88.20 88.14 88.24 0.3430 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 6.09 5.98 6.23 6.02 0.4792 
Ageofbus1-2 17.19 17.29 17.43 15.97 0.4327 
Ageofbus3-4 17.65 18.18 18.46 18.86 0.1876 
Ageofbus>4 59.07 56.65 57.88 57.61 0.3971 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 50.95 51.12 55.01 54.31 **0.0184 
Employees2-20 47.30 46.38 43.76 44.38 *0.0543 
Employees21-50 0.94 0.82 0.81 0.57 0.3433 
Employees51-100 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.3730 
Employees>100 0.57 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.5000 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.43 6.65 4.79 5.31 *0.0853 
Care 3.97 3.86 4.96 4.28 0.3381 
Events 22.12 21.03 21.80 20.71 0.2447 
Instruction 6.64 6.14 7.41 8.06 0.1424 
Vehicle 2.12 1.87 2.81 3.08 *0.0934 
Health 12.56 11.54 13.30 12.86 0.2020 
Home 35.88 36.45 34.22 35.00 0.1424 
Technology 9.68 9.07 9.78 9.52 0.2530 
Writing 0.60 0.00 0.93 0.83 **0.0309 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Table 6 compares the firm characteristics across the high- and low- “environmental regulations score” states. 
We are seeing that none of the operational area variables or the local sales variable (i.e., “mostlocal”) is 
significantly different between the two groups. In other words, the “high score states” and the “low score 
states” have similar values. When we look at firm age, again we are not seeing any significant difference 
between the two groups. None of the firm age variables is significantly different across high- and low-score 
states. With regard to firm size, we are seeing that there are fewer firms with a single employee in the high-
score states (i.e., 51.09%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 55.50%). This difference is significant 
(p=0.0073). Also, we are seeing that there are more firms with 2-20 employees in the high-score states (i.e., 
47.42%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 43.02%). This difference is also statistically significant 
(p=0.0132). This time, we are also seeing that there are fewer firms with 51-100 employees in the high-score 
states (i.e., 0.13%) compared to the low-score states (i.e., 0.32%). This difference is also statistically significant 
(p=0.0087). 
Table 6. The Impact of "Environmental Regulations" on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 64.32 67.35 65.36 66.87 0.3664 
Operstates2-5 27.72 25.45 27.53 27.11 0.5000 
Operstates>5 7.96 8.24 7.12 7.40 0.3468 
Mostlocal 87.39 88.89 88.02 87.23 0.2473 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 6.19 5.66 6.13 6.14 0.4895 
Ageofbus1-2 17.30 16.98 17.34 15.90 0.4116 
Ageofbus3-4 18.07 18.46 18.06 18.87 0.3276 
Ageofbus>4 58.44 57.14 58.48 58.41 0.2270 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 51.09 50.94 55.50 54.94 ***0.0073 
Employees2-20 47.42 47.84 43.02 44.28 **0.0132 
Employees21-50 0.90 0.62 0.84 0.81 0.4408 
Employees51-100 0.13 0.00 0.32 0.21 ***0.0087 
Employees>100 0.46 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.1585 
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Table 6 (cont.). The Impact of “Environmental Regulations” on Firm Characteristics 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.36 5.88 4.60 4.96 **0.0236 
Care 3.75 3.77 5.41 4.45 *0.0779 
Events 22.08 20.63 21.80 22.67 0.3468 
Instruction 6.85 6.13 7.28 8.31 0.1930 
Vehicle 2.44 2.78 2.51 2.55 0.5000 
Health 12.45 11.64 13.57 12.77 0.1930 
Home 35.56 36.21 34.35 34.89 0.2153 
Technology 10.04 9.52 9.34 9.20 0.4425 
Writing 0.47 0.00 1.14 0.94 ***0.0031 
Source: Compiled by the author 
With regard to firm industry, we are seeing that there is no significant difference between the two groups 
except for the “Business”, “Care”, and “Writing” industries. There are significantly more firms in the high-
score states that are in the “Business” industry when compared to the low-score states. On the other hand, there 
are significantly fewer firms in the high-score states that are in the “Care” and “Writing” industries when 
compared to the low-score states. Table 7 compares the firm characteristics across the high- and low- “zoning 
regulations score” states. We are seeing that none of the operational area variables or the local sales variable 
(i.e., “most local”) is significantly different between the two groups.  
Table 7. The Impact of “Zoning Regulations” on Firm Characteristics 
 High-Score Low-Score Mann-W. 
Variable Mean Med. Mean Med. p-value 
Panel A. Operational Area 
Operstates1 63.78 67.92 65.72 67.02 0.3382 
Operstates2-5 28.33 25.77 26.97 26.71 0.4174 
Operstates>5 7.89 7.31 7.31 8.07 0.4688 
Mostlocal 86.84 88.20 88.45 88.24 0.4948 
Panel B. Firm Age 
Ageofbus<1 5.49 5.56 6.81 6.67 *0.0875 
Ageofbus1-2 16.95 17.29 17.66 15.91 0.4636 
Ageofbus3-4 17.76 17.36 18.35 18.99 0.1229 
Ageofbus>4 59.80 58.41 57.19 57.14 0.2572 
Panel C. Firm Size 
Employees1 51.91 51.69 54.09 53.65 0.1423 
Employees2-20 46.55 45.26 44.48 44.38 0.1705 
Employees21-50 0.86 0.50 0.89 0.83 0.3684 
Employees51-100 0.17 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.1300 
Employees>100 0.51 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.2337 
Panel D. Firm Industry 
Business 6.53 6.46 4.69 5.00 **0.0252 
Care 3.93 3.80 5.00 4.42 0.1910 
Events 23.48 21.26 20.50 20.45 *0.0757 
Instruction 6.85 6.14 7.22 7.96 0.2406 
Vehicle 2.50 2.80 2.44 2.50 0.4532 
Health 12.49 11.54 13.37 12.86 0.1876 
Home 34.84 35.45 35.21 35.42 0.4378 
Technology 8.96 8.55 10.47 10.73 **0.0438 
Writing 0.42 0.00 1.10 0.98 ***0.0039 
Source: Compiled by the author 
When we look at firm age, we find that the two groups are significantly different only in terms of the percentage 
of firms that is less than one year old. Few firms are less than one year old in the high-score states (i.e., 5.49%) 
compared to the low-score states (i.e., 6.81%). This difference is significant (p=0.0875). None of the other 
firm age variables is significantly different across high- and low-score states. Regarding firm size, we see that 
none of the firm size variables is significantly different between the two groups. With regard to firm industry, 
we see that there is no significant difference between the two groups except for the “Business”, “Events”, 
“Technology”, and “Writing” industries. There are significantly more firms in the high-score states that are in 
the “Business” and “Events” industries when compared to the low-score states. On the other hand, there are 
significantly fewer firms in the high-score states that are in the “Technology” and “Writing” industries when 
compared to the low-score states.  
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5. Conclusion 
Most of the previous studies show that regulations have a negative impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
Regulations increase the costs of entry and compliance costs; hence they affect a firm’s decision to operate in 
that country/state. This impact is more pronounced for smaller firms (i.e., we call it the “size-effect”). In this 
study, we focus on U.S. states and examine whether regulations in a state affect the characteristics of firms 
operating in that state. Our first contribution is to determine whether different types of regulations in a U.S. 
state help attract or deter smaller firms from operating in that state (i.e., size-effect). We investigate whether 
“health and safety regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, 
“environmental regulations”, or “zoning regulations” in a state deter smaller firms from operating in that state. 
Our second contribution is to examine whether different types of regulations in a U.S. state affect other firm 
characteristics like firm age, firm industry, and operational area. What kind of firms are attracted to states with 
more favorable employment regulations? What kind of firms are attracted to states with a more favorable tax 
code? What kind of firms are attracted to states with more favorable licensing regulations? In other words, do 
more favorable regulations in certain areas help attract younger or older firms, or firms in certain industries, 
or larger firms operating in different states? Therefore, besides the size-effect, in this study, we also examine 
the relationship between regulations and other firm characteristics like firm age, industry, and operational area. 
Our results show that there are significant differences between the high-score states and the low-score states. 
We find that “health and safety regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, 
and “environmental regulations” in a state affect firm size and industry but do not affect the operational area 
and firm age. Therefore, we can say that attracting larger firms or firms from certain sectors depends upon the 
quality of regulations in the eyes of the business owners. In the states with high scores in these areas, there are 
fewer single-employee firms and more than 2-20 employee firms compared to the other states. We also find 
that in the states with a high score in “environmental regulations”, there are fewer firms with 51 to 100 
employees when compared to the other states. 
On the other hand, “zoning regulations” affect firm age and industry, but not operational area and firm size. 
Few firms were established less than a year ago in the states with high scores in “zoning regulations”. We can 
say that, in the states with high scores in regulations, generally, there are more firms in the “Business” industry 
and fewer firms in the “Writing” industry. 
To conclude, our results show that there is a size-effect for “health and safety regulations”, “employment 
regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, and “environmental regulations”. There is a no-size effect 
(i.e., certain size groups are not more or less common in the states with above-average zoning regulations). 
There are more firms with 2-20 employees in the states where “health and safety regulations”, “employment 
regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, and “environmental regulations” are more favorable. 
Interestingly, there are fewer single-employee firms in the states where these regulations are more favorable. 
Therefore, we can say that the decision-making process (i.e., starting and continuing operations in a state) for 
a single-employee firm is different from the decision-making process for other small firms. Our results also 
show that there is no age-effect or an operational area-effect about “health and safety regulations”, 
“employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, and “environmental regulations”. In other 
words, in the states where these regulations are more favorable, we do not find younger or older firms to be 
more common or firms with a larger or smaller operational area to be more common. Interestingly, we find 
that in the states with more favorable zoning regulations, there are fewer newly founded (age less than one) firms. 
With regard to industry-effect, we find that different types of regulations attract firms to other industries. 
Therefore, there is evidence of an industry-effect. Better regulations in certain areas attract more firms in 
certain sectors. Policymakers should consider the findings in this study when devising their strategies to attract 
small businesses to their states. If they want to attract smaller firms, then they need to improve “health and 
safety regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, and “environmental 
regulations”. If they want to attract younger firms or firms operating in larger areas, regulations do not seem 
to matter. If they want to attract firms into certain industries, they need to improve certain regulations, as shown 
in this study. We believe that these findings are important. Entrepreneurial activity in different countries may 
react differently to different types of regulations, but our results can be taken as a base for country-specific 
studies that will be done in the future. 
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